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IRREFLEXIVITY AND ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISMOS
ByMatthew Duncombe
Aristotle’s definition of syllogismos at Prior Analytics 24b18–20 specifies syllogistic consequence as
an irreflexive relation: the conclusion must be different from each premise and any conjunction of the
premises. Typically, commentators explain this irreflexivity condition as Aristotle’s attempt to brand
question-begging syllogismoi illegitimate in argumentative contexts. However, this explanation faces
two problems. First, it fails to consider all the contexts in which Aristotle thinks syllogismoi are deployed.
Secondly, irreflexivity rules out only some arguments that Aristotle considers question begging. Here I
address these problems. First, I examine all the contexts in which Aristotle thinks syllogismoi can be
used. Secondly, I argue that, for each context, irreflexivity makes sense as a condition, but for different
reasons. Assuming that a condition which holds in each context is a condition on syllogistic consequence
tout court, this explains why Aristotle holds syllogistic consequence to be an irreflexive relation.
Keywords: Aristotle, syllogism, logic, consequence, Prior Analytics, question
begging.
Aristotle’s definition of syllogismos at Prior Analytics 24b18–20 specifies that syl-
logistic consequence is an irreflexive relation: the conclusion must be different
from each premise. [I here transliterate, rather than translate, Aristotle’s word
συλλoγισμo´ς. No translation is without serious drawbacks (see Smith 1989:
106; Bolton 1994: 110; Striker 2009: 78). I hope to avoid raising those issues
by avoiding translation. Unless otherwise noted, translations from Greek are
based on the most recent English language translations. I have modified some
translations for consistency, accuracy or fidelity.] Indeed, irreflexivity seems to
rule out arguments whose conclusion is a conjunction of some or all of the
premises. At first sight, irreflexivity may seem strange, because if truth preser-
vation is necessary and sufficient for a consequence relation, then that relation
ought to be reflexive: ‘p, therefore p’ is obviously truth-preserving. Tradition-
ally, commentators have thought that irreflexivity is a necessary condition on
being a syllogismos, and Aristotle introduced the irreflexivity condition for prag-
matic reasons, that is, reasons to do with how syllogismoi are used. Irreflexivity, it
is usually thought, rules out the argumentative faux pas of begging the question.
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IRREFLEXIVITY AND ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISMOS 435
This explanation faces two problems. The first problem is the exhaustion
objection. The traditional explanation is committed to the idea that irreflex-
ivity is partly constitutive of the notion of being a syllogismos just in case ir-
reflexivity holds in all pragmatic contexts. If this equivalence is correct, the
traditional explanation of Aristotle’s irreflexivity condition needs to show why
irreflexivity holds in all pragmatic contexts which Aristotle considers. But the
traditional explanation does not do this. The second problem is the insuf-
ficiency objection. In the context of demonstration, considered in the Prior
Analytics, Aristotle thinks of begging the question as a broader argumentative
failure than reflexivity. Irreflexivity would rule out some, but not all, of the
arguments that Aristotle considers question begging. Introducing irreflexivity
is not sufficient to rule out question begging.
This paper remedies these defects by showing that irreflexivity is a sensi-
ble condition in each context where Aristotle thinks syllogismoi can be used.
The first section articulates the irreflexivity problem more fully. The second
section discusses the traditional view and shows the flaws in that explanation.
The third section outlines my own explanation of irreflexivity in Aristotle’s
conception of consequence, as it emerges from his definition of syllogismos,
which I call ‘syllogistic consequence’.1 Although in different contexts irreflex-
ivity is a condition on syllogismoi for different reasons, in any pragmatic context
in which Aristotle envisions syllogismoi being used, it is a plausible condition
for giving a syllogismos. So the definition of a syllogismos includes irreflexivity
because a syllogismos will be irreflexive across contexts, and thus regardless of
the context.
This paper may interest philosophers of logic, as well as historians. Many
philosophers consider an irreflexive consequence relation to be disreputable.
Some deny that any consequence relation could be irreflexive. Others claim
that formal systems that have a non-reflexive consequence relation are ‘logics’
merely by family resemblance. But this paper looks at how Aristotle thinks
arguments can be used and thereby explains why an irreflexive consequence
relation makes sense to Aristotle. From Aristotle’s ‘logic in action’ perspective,
irreflexivity is a more palatable condition on consequence than is usually
thought. This paper speaks tomodern debates because it shows how conditions
on logical consequence that are usually thought outlandish can seem plausible
against the background of certain uses of argument. If one thinks, like Aristotle,
that an argument is an action used to do things in a context, the conditions on
logical consequence might differ significantly from our own.
1 I use ‘logical consequence’ or ‘consequence’ to refer to any relation between premises
and conclusion that has necessary truth preservation (NTP) as a necessary condition; ‘classical
consequence’ refers to a consequence relation which has NTP as a necessary and sufficient
condition and ‘syllogistic consequence’ refers to whatever consequence relation is captured by
Aristotle’s definition of a syllogismos. ‘To entail’ is the verb that corresponds to ‘consequence’.
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436 MATTHEW DUNCOMBE
I. WHY IRREFLEXIVITY?
A logical consequence relation relates the premises of an inference to the con-
clusion. Aristotle’s definition of a syllogismos captures his notion of consequence:
(T1) A syllogismos is ‘(i) an argument (logos) in which, certain things having been posited,
(ii) something other (heteron) than what has been laid down (iii) follows by necessity (iv)
because these things are so’ (Prior Analytics 24b18–20) (Translation Striker 2009: ad loc;
cf. Smith 1997: 100a25–28; Forster 1955: 164b27–165a2.).
This is a definition of syllogismos, not, strictly speaking, an account of logical
consequence. ‘Syllogismoi’ which do not conform to the definition are not
invalid; they are simply not syllogismoi at all. However, the definition implies
that, where a syllogismos exists, a certain relationship holds between the premises
and conclusion. Call this relationship ‘syllogistic consequence’. According to
T1, syllogistic consequence is non-reflexive. In fact, it is irreflexive: (ii) says
that a syllogismos must have a conclusion different from the premises. Indeed,
Aristotle claims that the conclusion must differ from every premise or some
conjunction of the premises.2 So an argument such as ‘it is day; therefore,
it is day’ is not a syllogismos, but neither is the following argument given by
Alexander of Aphrodisias:3
1. If it is day, it is light;
2. But it is light;
3. So, it is light. 4
Although classically valid, this argument is not a syllogismos, and the conclusion
does not follow by syllogistic consequence. Syllogistic consequence is, as we
will see below, importantly different from ‘classical’ consequence. Necessary
truth preservation (NTP) is necessary and sufficient for classical consequence
to hold between some premises and conclusion. NTP is necessary for syl-
logistic consequence, but not sufficient. Along with some other additional
conditions, syllogistic consequence is irreflexive. Alexander’s argument does
have a premise different to the conclusion, premise (1), but is still not a syllo-
gismos because (2) is identical to the conclusion and hence the argument is not
irreflexive. Finally, although it is not explicit in T1, the spirit of the irreflexiv-
ity condition rules out syllogismoi with a conclusion that is the conjunction of
some or all of the premises. As we will see below, Topics 163a10–11 shows that
2 Commentators sometimes overlook the irreflexivity condition on syllogistic consequence,
e.g., Ross (1949: 91); but generally, it is noted, e.g., Smith (1989: 110) and Striker (2009: 80).
3 ‘It is day; therefore, it is day’ is not a syllogismos for several reasons: it is reflexive, but also
syllogistic consequence does not hold between only one premise and a conclusion.
4 Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Prior Analytics 18, 15–20. Note that arguments with conditional
premises do not form part of Aristotle’s formal syllogistic system, but his informal definition of
syllogismos does not rule them out, so Alexander’s is a legitimate example for my purposes.
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IRREFLEXIVITY AND ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISMOS 437
Aristotle considers a conclusion that is just the conjunction of the premises to
be identical to the premises, in the relevant sense.
From the point of view of modern classical logic, irreflexivity looks unac-
ceptable. An inference like ‘p; therefore, p’ seems as good as can be. Moreover,
a standard account of propositional calculus seems to have reflexivity as a
trivial consequence. For example, the deducibility relation might say that if a
formula is a member of a set of formulae, then that formula is deducible from
that set. If ϕ is a member of 	, then 	ϕ. This grounds the recursive definition
of other admissible rules of inference, in a natural deduction system. But since
ϕ is a member of the set {ϕ}, ϕ is deducible from the set that includes only
itself. So reflexivity holds. Reflexivity, in a formal logic as we now understand
it, holds because the limiting case of the deducibility relation is reflexive.
These formal reasons are supplemented by philosophical reasons to think
that logical consequence is reflexive. Classical consequence holds just in case
if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. This condition
is known as ‘necessary truth preservation’ (NTP). Classical consequence, so
defined, is a reflexive relation. For every premise p, classical consequence holds
between p and itself because if NTP is sufficient for a consequence relation,
then that relation is reflexive. If the premise and conclusion are both p, then
the premise and conclusion must have the same truth value. If the premises
and conclusions must have the same truth value, then there can be no situation
where the former are true but the latter is false. If there can be no situation
where the premises are true and the conclusion is false, then NTP holds. If
NTP is sufficient for consequence, then the premises entail the conclusion. But
the premises and conclusion were both p. So consequence is reflexive.
Aristotle would deny that NTP suffices for syllogistic consequence, since he
puts additional conditions on syllogistic consequence. (iv) is often taken to be
a relevance condition on the conclusion, while (ii) is an irreflexivity condition.
But Aristotle would still think NTP a necessary condition of syllogistic conse-
quence, as (iii) seems to say. In this respect, Aristotle’s syllogistic consequence
relation is non-classical. In many non-classical logics, NTP is not sufficient
for consequence to obtain, but is necessary. But even logical pluralists, such
as Beall and Restall, hold that any respectable consequence relation, even a
non-classical one, will not be irreflexive: ‘non-transitive or irreflexive systems
of “logical consequence” are logics by courtesy and by family resemblance,
where the courtesy is granted via analogy with logics properly so called’ (Beall
and Restall 2009: 91). Beall and Restall go on to suggest that irreflexive conse-
quence gets truth preservation wrong.
For these reasons, a consequence relation that denies reflexivity seems
strange. So how can we explain Aristotle’s irreflexivity condition on being a
syllogismos? Commentators usually say that the logical condition of irreflexivity
precludes an argumentative faux pas now known as ‘begging the question’. I will
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438 MATTHEW DUNCOMBE
discuss, and dismiss, this explanation. I go on to suggest a better explanation
of irreflexivity: irreflexivity is a condition in any pragmatic context Aristotle
imagines a syllogismos being deployed in.
II. THE TRADITIONAL EXPLANATION OF IRREFLEXIVITY
II.1 Begging the question and irreflexivity
In various places, Aristotle discusses an argumentative foul that he calls ‘asking
for the starting point’ (TopicsVIII.13; Posterior Analytics II.16).5 Recently, Castag-
noli (2012: 90–121) has clarified what this fallacy amounts to in the different
texts, and what the relationships between them are. However, commentators
often think that Aristotle includes irreflexivity in the definition of syllogismos to
rule out question-begging arguments (Kapp 1975: 41; Striker 2009: 80; Castag-
noli 2012; 100–4). Others have argued that begging the question is a violation
of the rules in Aristotle’s questioning game, but they remain silent on its rela-
tion to irreflexivity (Hintikka 1987: 219–20). See alsoWoods and Hansen (1997:
217–39) and Hintikka (1997: 241–9). Castagnoli (2012: 111) takes a different line
with the Prior Analytics notion of syllogismoi: he holds that irreflexivity means that
some question-begging arguments are also non-syllogistic. But, I respond here,
since begging the question is a broader problem than simply having a premise
the same as the conclusion, irreflexivity cannot have been introduced to rule
out begging the question. Their reasoning seems to be: question-begging ar-
guments have a conclusion that is the same as a premise; irreflexivity rules
out arguments that have a conclusion the same as a premise. So, irreflexivity
rules out question-begging arguments. Therefore, the best explanation of the
presence of irreflexivity in the definition of a syllogismos is Aristotle’s desire to
rule out question-begging arguments (cf. Hintikka 1987). See also Castagnoli
(2012: 99–104).
This suggests that Aristotle includes irreflexivity as a constitutive condition
on being a syllogismos for argumentative, i.e., pragmatic, reasons. But in T1,
Aristotle attempts a general definition of a syllogismos and he lists constitutive
conditions on being one. So the traditional explanation relates the constitutive
conditions on being a syllogismos to the pragmatic contexts in which syllogismoi
are used. Pragmatic conditions, such as a condition not to beg the question,
can become incorporated into the constitutive account of a syllogismos. How?
It must be that pragmatic conditions just are constitutive conditions. So the
overall traditional explanation is this: (a) irreflexivity holds in some pragmatic
5 The Greek expressions to aiteisthai to en archeˆi and to lambanein to en archeˆi literally mean
‘asking for the starting point’ and ‘taking the starting point’. Latin derives its expression petitio
principii from the Greek. English derives ‘begging the question’ from the Latin. I use the English
equivalent in my discussion.
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IRREFLEXIVITY AND ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISMOS 439
contexts; (b) irreflexivity holds because it rules out begging the question in these
contexts; so (c) Aristotle introduced irreflexivity as a constitutive condition on
being a syllogismos.
But now the traditional explanation faces a problem with (a), which I style
the exhaustion objection. Grant that pragmatic conditions can be constitu-
tive conditions. Pragmatics studies the use of certain linguistic items, such as
arguments, in contexts. But the pragmatic conditions on a syllogismos might
vary between pragmatic contexts. For example, in the context of demonstra-
tion, using a syllogismos to prove a conclusion, the demonstrator simply ‘takes’
(assumes) the premises (Smith 1989: 24a22–3 and Ackrill 1963: 20b22–3; cf.
Smith 1997: 104a8–9; Forster 1955: 171a38–b2, 172a15–20). But in the context
of dialectic, the dialectician must ask for the premises from her interlocutor
(Smith 1989: 24a24–5; Smith 1997: 155b3–10). The conditions on establishing
premises vary by pragmatic context. How does the traditional explanation
differentiate between pragmatic conditions which vary by context (like how
the premises are established) and pragmatic conditions which are constitutive
conditions, and so do not vary by context (like the conclusion following by
necessity)?
Defenders of the traditional explanation could claim that a condition is
constitutive just in case it holds in all pragmatic contexts. Since the condition
that the conclusion follows by necessity will hold in all pragmatic contexts, it is a
constitutive condition. But how the premises are established differs in different
contexts and so these conditions are not constitutive. If this is the line, defenders
of the traditional explanation have not proved their case. Why does Aristotle
include irreflexivity as a constitutive condition on being a syllogismos? The
answer must be irreflexivity is a pragmatic condition in all contexts. However,
defenders of the traditional explanation have not exhaustively considered the
pragmatic contexts that are relevant, or even those Aristotle considers relevant:
the context of ‘arguing’ is only one pragmatic context in which syllogismoi can be
used. Aristotle mentions a range of other pragmatic contexts. Since defenders
of the traditional explanation have not discussed all relevant contexts, they
have not proved their case.
II.2 Irreflexivity as insufficient to rule out begging the question
The second problem with the traditional explanation is that (b) is false. I
call this the insufficiency objection. In the Prior Analytics, irreflexivity rules out
some cases that Aristotle considers question begging, but not all such cases. So,
irreflexivity is insufficient to rule out begging the question. Aristotle’s discussion
of that fallacy in Prior Analytics II.16 will help us to see this. Aristotle says:
(T2) To ask for, to take, the starting point is (to take its genus) a kind of failure to
demonstrate what is proposed, but this happens in several ways. For this happens (i) if
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440 MATTHEW DUNCOMBE
someone does not syllogise at all, or (ii) if they demonstrate through more unfamiliar
things, or equally unfamiliar things or (iii) if they demonstrate a prior thing through
a posterior (for a demonstration is by means of things more credible and prior). In
fact, none of these is begging the question (64b28–37) (Translation Smith 1989: ad loc.,
modified; see Lear 1986: 86–90 for criticism of Aristotle’s account of begging the question
given here).
Aristotle begins with the point that a question-begging argument fails to
demonstrate its conclusion. But he immediately tells us that failure to demon-
strate has several kinds. The first is failure to syllogise (Castagnoli 2012: 106).
Since all demonstrations are syllogismoi (Smith 1989: 25b28–31), if a sequence of
statements is not a syllogismos, it cannot be a demonstration. Secondly, there is
no demonstration through equally unfamiliar things. A demonstration moves
from the more familiar to the less familiar. Thirdly, there is no demonstration
of the prior from the posterior, since every demonstration moves from the prior
to the posterior. Aristotle then says that none of these three demonstrative
failures is begging the question.
For my argument, the first is the most important. Aristotle stresses that
begging the question is not a failure to give a syllogismos. What does he mean
by ‘failure to give a syllogismos’ in this context? It must mean that the string of
statements offered by the demonstrator fails to meet the definition of syllogismos
given at Prior Analytics 24b18–20. You do not give a syllogismos if: the conclusion
is the same as some premise; the conclusion does not follow necessarily from
the premises; or the conclusion does not come about through the premises.
But, as Aristotle points out, none of these failures amount to begging the
question. So, a fortiori, having a conclusion the same as a premise does not
amount to begging the question. Thus, a syllogismos with a conclusion different
from a premise could still be question begging. So irreflexivity is not sufficient
to rule out begging the question.
This conclusion is supported by Aristotle’s explicit discussion of begging
the question in dialectic at Topics VIII.13. There he portrays it as a mistake in
the Topics debating game. Such a game has two participants, a questioner and
an answerer. The questioner aims to force the answerer to accept a certain
conclusion by asking questions. The questioner, Aristotle says, can beg the
question in one of five ways. First, asking for the very thing that needs to be
proved, or some synonym of it (162b35–9). Second, asking for a universal while
trying to prove a particular (163a1–5). Third, asking for a particular when
trying to prove a universal (163a5–9). Fourth, dividing up what is to be proved
and asking for each separately (163a10–1). Fifth, asking for one premise that is
logically equivalent to what has to be proved (163a11–3).
Aristotle’s discussion in the Topics claims that question begging has vari-
ous species. Some have argued that, in the Sophistical Refutations discussion of
begging the question, Aristotle understands ‘what is the same and what is
different’ (Forster 1955: 167a36–9) broadly enough to encompass all five ways
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IRREFLEXIVITY AND ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISMOS 441
mentioned in the Topics (Castagnoli 2012: 99–102). This would mean that all
five ways of begging the question are, in effect, violations of irreflexivity and
so, contrary to my argument, irreflexivity is sometimes seen as sufficient to
rule out begging the question. The first type, for example, does involve asking
for something ‘the same’ as what needs to be proved. It is also plausible that a
synonym is, in some sense, the same as what needs to be proved: they are logi-
cally equivalent. The fourth sort could also be viewed as involving ‘sameness’,
since, when conjoined, the premises are identical to what needs to be proved.
I acknowledge the force of this point for certain types of question begging,
but maintain that some are not violations of the irreflexivity condition. See,
for example, Kakkuri-Knuuttila (2005: 55) who argues that only the first and
fifth ways of begging the question are violations of the irreflexivity condition
of being a syllogismos.
Specifically, the second and third types of question begging do not seem
to be violations of irreflexivity. The third type, for example, is asking for a
particular when trying to prove a universal. It is hard to think of a suitable
sense in which a universal premise and a particular premise are the same.
In fact, when we look at Aristotle’s discussion of induction earlier in Topics
VIII, at 156a5–7, he is clear that particular statements are more familiar than
universal statements. If particular statements are more familiar than universal
statements, particular statements cannot be the same as universal statements.
So at least some species of begging the question do not involve having a
conclusion the same as a premise. So some question-begging arguments are
reflexive and some are non-reflexive. Thus, ruling out reflexive arguments will
not suffice to rule out all question-begging arguments.
I have given two objections. First was the exhaustion objection. The tradi-
tional explanation does not examine enough contexts to be persuasive. Irreflex-
ivity needs to hold in all the pragmatic contexts that Aristotle considers relevant
for irreflexivity to be a constitutive condition on being a syllogismos. Second
was the insufficiency objection. In the contexts of demonstration and dialectic,
Aristotle thinks that begging the question is a broader foul than reflexivity.
So irreflexivity would not rule out all, but only some, question-begging argu-
ments. Irreflexivity is not sufficient to rule out begging the question.
In section III, I propose to remedy these problems by examining all the
pragmatic contexts where Aristotle thinks a syllogismos could be deployed. To
my mind, it is an advantage of my account that it shows Aristotle retaining a
single sense of ‘syllogismos’ across the various contexts. I claim that irreflexivity
holds in all the pragmatic contexts in which syllogismoi are imagined to be used.
I do not suggest, therefore, a ‘validity-relativism’ that Smith worries about (see
Smith 1997: 150). My position suggests that, for Aristotle, it is not necessary
that there is one single notion of validity across all contexts, but, as it turns out,
the same notion applies across all contexts, for diverse reasons. This addresses
the first objection, i.e., that only some pragmatic contexts are considered. To
 at D
urham
 U
niversity Library on Septem
ber 29, 2015
http://pq.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
442 MATTHEW DUNCOMBE
address the second objection, I show, for each context, why irreflexivity makes
sense as a condition. It turns out that in each context, irreflexivity makes sense
for different reasons.
III. EXPLAINING IRREFLEXIVITY
Aristotle enumerates different pragmatic contexts in which syllogismoi can be
used in several passages. At Topics 100a27–30, after having defined a syllogismos
in a way almost identical to T1, Aristotle says:
(T4) It (sc. a syllogismos) is a demonstration whenever the syllogismos is from true and
primary things or from similar things that have attained the starting point of knowledge
about themselves through true and primary things. Dialectical syllogismoi syllogise from
reputable opinions (Smith 1997: ad loc., modified; cf. Smith 1989: 24a30–b3).
This passage distinguishes two sorts of syllogismoi: demonstrative and dialectic.
Aristotle makes this distinction using pragmatic, indeed epistemic, considera-
tions, rather than logical ones. Aristotle points out that the epistemic status of
the premises marks a difference in pragmatic context: demonstrative syllogismoi
have true and primary premises or premises related in the right way to true
and primary things, while dialectical syllogismoi have merely reputable opinions
as premises. A little later in the same passage, Aristotle mentions a third sort of
syllogismoi, eristic syllogismoi, again distinguished by the epistemic status of their
premises, but also the logical consideration of whether they fail to be syllogismoi:
(T4 cont.) An eristic syllogismos is from apparently reputable, but not actually rep-
utable opinions, and an apparent syllogismos from either reputable, or merely apparently
reputable opinions (Smith 1997: ad loc., modified).
As in the above case, Aristotle demarcates eristic syllogismoi primarily using
non-logical considerations: for example, the epistemic status of the premises,
which is a non-logical consideration. A logical consideration, namely, whether
the syllogismos is real or apparent, is only mentioned as a secondary way of
dividing up syllogismoi, and only then when epistemic considerations, such as
whether the premises are reputable, have already been invoked.
While the Topics divides syllogismoi into sorts by appealing primarily to prag-
matic considerations, without specifying straight away howmany interlocutors
are involved, the Sophistical Refutations divides up uses of argument within one
particular context, namely, discussions which involve more than one person.
Aristotle tells us that:
(T5) There are four kinds of argument used in discussion: didactic, dialectical, peirastic
and eristic. Didactic [arguments] are syllogismoi from the principles appropriate to each
branch of learning and not from the opinions of the answerer (for it is necessary for
the learner to trust); dialectical [arguments] are syllogismoi of the contradiction, from
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IRREFLEXIVITY AND ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISMOS 443
reputable opinions; peirastic [arguments] are syllogismoi based on the beliefs of the
answerer and necessarily known to one who claims to know the subject (in which
manner has been defined in other places); eristic [arguments] are syllogismoi, or apparent
syllogismoi, from apparently reputable but not actually reputable opinions (Forster 1955:
ad loc., modified).
T5 demarcates, then, four uses of argument in discussion: use in didactic,
that is contexts of teaching; dialectic again; peirastic, roughly, contexts of
Socratic questioning; and eristic, which I have already mentioned. All the
sorts of argument mentioned in T5 involve two interlocutors. This is to be
expected, since the opening sentence describes these as sorts of argument used
in discussion, the pragmatic context in the case of each syllogismos involves two
participants. Hintikka (1987: 299) uses this feature as an argument for his claim
that the Sophistical Refutations as a whole pertains to the study of interrogative
dialogues.
How many contexts are mentioned in T4 and T5? There are at least four:
demonstrative, dialectical, peirastic and eristic. But is there also a fifth, namely
the context of didactic? Commentators have argued that T5 identifies the
didactic syllogismoi with demonstrative ones mentioned in T4 (Barnes 1975b:
123–52). Barnes takes this as part of his argument that demonstrative syllo-
gisms are a didactic tool, for systematically presenting a body of knowledge
(see also Barnes 1975a: 77). For important qualifications, see Wians (1989:
245–53). This identification is not obvious, since there is a formal difference
between demonstrative and didactic syllogismoi, namely, didactic syllogismoi have
a question-and-answer format, while demonstrative syllogismoimay not. There
are references in Aristotle to ‘demonstrative questions’ (Barnes 1972a: 77a36–
b39; 75a22–7), but this evidence is not strong enough to identify demonstrative
and didactic syllogismoi.
This problem arises because T4 and T5 have a slightly different emphasis.
T4 distinguishes kinds of syllogismoi, independent of whether they are used in
question-and-answer discussions, but does not rule out their use in such a way,
while T5 considers only syllogismoi used in such discussions. For Aristotle, there
is clearly a close relationship between demonstrative and didactic arguments.
Both begin from truths (cf. Smith 1997: 161a25; Barnes 1972a: 71b25–7) and the
premises are more familiar than the conclusion (cf. Rhetoric: 1355a24–7; Barnes
1972a: 71b20–4). It may be that the form, namely, whether the syllogismos is
presented using the question-and-answer format or not, is the principal dif-
ference between demonstration and didactic syllogismoi. Whatever the answer
to this question, it is safer for my interpretation to discuss demonstration and
didactic separately: irreflexivity makes sense in each case, as we will see.
T4 and T5 show the different ways in which Aristotle thinks syllogismoi
can be used, whether demonstrative, dialectical, didactic, peirastic or eristic.
To improve on the traditional explanation of the irreflexivity condition in
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444 MATTHEW DUNCOMBE
the definition of syllogismos, I need to prove that reflexivity holds in none
of the pragmatic contexts that Aristotle discusses. So irreflexivity will be a
condition in all such pragmatic contexts. The pragmatic context can determine
the constitutive properties, a point agreed by the traditional explanation. So
Aristotle includes irreflexivity as a constitutive condition because it holds in all
relevant pragmatic contexts. I will look at the pragmatic situation for each of
the syllogismoi in turn.
The procedure is followed by Alexander in his discussion of the ‘heteron’
clause in the definition (On Prior Analytics: 18, 23-19,3). Alexander only discusses
syllogismoi used in demonstration, dialectic and eristic. Alexander’s list is pre-
sumably based on Topics 100a27–b26. My approach is inspired by Alexander’s,
but differs from his in detail. Alexander’s aim is to show that, in each of the
three cases, a reflexive syllogismos is not a useful syllogismos. Alexander would
then combine this with two further premises: (i) a syllogismos is a tool (On Topics:
9, 22) and (ii) a useless tool is not that tool, except homonymously (On Prior
Analytics: 164, 31–165,2). Alexander would then conclude that a reflexive syllo-
gismos is not a syllogismos, except homonymously. But it seems to me that (ii) is
false and that I do not have to take a view on (i). For further discussion, see
Barnes (2007: 457–63). In each case, we will rule out reflexivity because of the
way Aristotle envisions the syllogismoi being used.
I begin with demonstrative syllogismoi. These syllogismoi are discussed in the
Prior Analytics, but the context comes in the Posterior Analytics. Aristotle tells
us as much when he introduces the Prior Analytics with the remark that the
object of the enquiry is ‘demonstrative science’ (Smith 1989: 24a10). Irreflex-
ivity makes sense as a condition on demonstrative syllogismoi. The Posterior
Analytics posits a limited number of kinds of statements from which a demon-
stration can proceed: a thesis, an axiom or a hypothesis. A thesis is an im-
mediate indemonstrable starting point of a syllogismos (Barnes 1975a: 72a15–7).
Aristotle introduces such indemonstrable starting points because they may
allow him to avoid the dilemma discussed at Posterior Analytics 72b5–25: if all
known things are demonstrable, and S knows that p, then either S is forced into
a regress of demonstrations, or S must give circular or reciprocal demonstra-
tion of p. But neither of these options is acceptable, so some indemonstrable,
q, is known, from which p can be demonstrated. q is then a starting point.
But if the starting point is immediate and indemonstrable, there can be
no syllogismos to that starting point. If there were, the starting point would
be demonstrable. Hence, if the starting point is a thesis, Aristotle is correct to
model syllogismoi as irreflexive. Hypotheses are a sort of thesis, so the same
considerations apply (Barnes 1975a: 72a21–2). Axioms are ‘principles which
anyone who is going to learn must possess’ (see Barnes 1975a: 140). But,
as Aristotle says a little further down, we must know these better than the
conclusion of the syllogismos (Barnes 1975a: 72a29–30). Since the starting points
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of a demonstration, whatever these are, will be more better known than the
conclusion, they have a property that distinguishes them from the conclusion.
If this is the case, a premise and the conclusion cannot be identical and so
irreflexivity holds. Irreflexivity, it seems, is a non-logical condition on using
a syllogismos as a demonstration. That condition pertains to the (epistemic)
function of a demonstration.
T2, which I discussed above in a different context, also helps us to see why
Aristotle thinks demonstrative syllogismoi would be irreflexive. T2 tells us some
ways in which a demonstration can fail. One way is to attempt to ‘demonstrate
through more unfamiliar (agnoˆstoteroˆn) things, or equally unfamiliar (agnoˆstoˆn)
things’ (Smith 1989: 64b31–2, ad loc., modified). T2 also mentions that a
demonstration can fail because the premises are not ‘prior’ to the conclusion
(Smith 1989: 64b33–4), but in the Posterior Analytics (Barnes 1972a: 71b31–72a5),
Aristotle seems to identify the familiarity and priority requirements. In any
case, discussing familiarity is sufficient for the point I wish to make. That is, in
a demonstration the premises must be strictly more familiar than the conclu-
sion. Aristotle’s idea of ‘familiarity’ and ‘unfamiliarity’ needs some explaining.
Aristotle has an illuminating discussion in the Topics, where he points out that
both genus and differentia are more familiar than the species because:
(T6) if the species is known, then necessarily both the genus and differentia are known
(for he who knows man also knows animal and footed), but if the genus or differentia
is known, it is not necessary that the species is also known (Forster 1960: 141b30-4,
modified).
Aristotle’s analysis of being more familiar is in modal and epistemological
terms. In this example, ‘man’ names the species, while ‘animal’ and ‘footed’
name the genus and differentia respectively. Aristotle’s point is that an agent
can know the genus, being an animal, without necessarily knowing the species,
being aman. Likewise with the differentia, footed. But it is not possible to know
the species without knowing the differentia.We could formulate Aristotle’s idea
of familiarity this way:
(F) X is more familiar to a than Y iff it is possible that (a knowsX and a does not knowY).6
If (F) is the correct way to state Aristotle’s principle, the ‘more familiar than’
relation is irreflexive.Whenwe replace ‘X’ and ‘Y’ in the schemawith the same
expression, the right-hand side of the resulting biconditional is false. For (F) to
hold, whatever replaces ‘X’ cannot also replace ‘Y’. Thus, demonstrations that
6 The brackets in this formulation indicate that the possibility operator has a wide scope.
Although T6 refers to genus and differentia, which are terms, Aristotle does not, in general,
distinguish between individuals, terms and propositions when discussing familiarity. Hence, ‘X’
and ‘Y’ can range over any of these classes.
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obey this familiarity condition must obey irreflexivity.7 A demonstration must
have premises strictlymore familiar than the conclusion; the conclusion cannot
even be as familiar as the premises. This, of course, entails that the conclusion
differs from each premise, since ‘is more familiar than’ is an irreflexive relation,
on Aristotle’s stated view. In virtue of the irreflexivity of ‘more familiar than’,
the premises must be different from the conclusion.
In demonstrative contexts, syllogismoi are irreflexive for an epistemic reason:
in dialectical contexts syllogismoi are irreflexive for more diverse reasons. The
Topics says that two agents participate in a dialectical syllogismos and it proceeds
by question-and-answer [for a forceful argument on this point, see Smith (1993:
337)]. The syllogismoi proceed from reputable opinions and aim to drive one
party into a contradiction [for details of the structure of the Topics game, see
P. Moraux (1968: 302); Slomkowski (1997). Castelne´rac and Marion (2009)
suggest a rather different ‘rational reconstruction’ of the Topics game, in light
of Plato’s Socratic dialogues]. I mentioned above some features of Aristotle’s
Topics dialectical game. A few more details will help us see why irreflexivity
makes sense in this context. The questioner and the answerer are the two
participants. The questioner presents a problema (‘problem’) to the answerer.
All problems are questions of the form ‘is X Y or not?’, offering the answerer
the choice of one of a pair of contradictories.8 For example, ‘Are knowledge
and perception the same or not?’ (cf. Smith 1997: 102a8). The answerer selects
one of the contradictories. This is usually called the ‘starting point’ (to en archeˆi).
I will label it p. The questioner then tries to compel the answerer, by means
of ‘yes or no’ questions, to concede the contradictory of the starting point,
namely, not-p (cf. Bolton 1994:103).
Some intermediate conclusions, which are needed as part of a larger argu-
ment for the overall conclusion, may be concealed. Owen (1968: 107) claims
that the tactics for concealment discussed in the Topics are recommended only
in eristic contexts. Each statement that the answerer accepts along the way is
called a protasis (‘proposition’ or ‘premise’). Finally, the answerer is forced to
accept the sumperasma (‘conclusion’), won by a series of such questions. Ryle
points out that neither competitor is committed to the truth or falsehood
of p in propria persona. It is accepted or denied merely for the sake of argu-
ment (see Ryle 1968: 74–5; Moraux 1968: 302; Slomkowski 1997: 107). We can
see in the example below that (1) represents the problema, presented by the
7 More could be said about this familiarity principle. For example, what if ‘X’ and ‘Y’
are replaced by ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, where ‘Hesperus’ and
‘Phosphorus’ co-refer? In this case, (F) seems to get the right result. In that case, the right hand
side says ‘it is possible that (a knows that Hesperus is Hesperus and a does not know that Hesperus
is Phosphorus)’, which is true, and the left hand side says ‘Hesperus is Hesperus is more familiar
to a than Hesperus is Phosphorus’, which is also true.
8 ‘X’ and ‘Y’ can range over individuals or terms.
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questioner, and starting point, chosen by the answerer, (2)–(6) the protaseis, and
(7) the sumperasma:
1. Q: Are knowledge and perception the same, or not? A: They are the same.
2. Q: Is it possible to both know and not know the same thing at the same
time? A: No.
3. Q: If I remember something, do I know it? A: Yes.
4. Q: If I remember something, do I perceive it? A: No.
5. Q: So, if I remember something, I both know it and do not perceive it? A:
Yes
6. Q: But knowing and perceiving are the same? A: Yes
7. Q: So if I remember something, I both know and do not know it. Which
you agreed is impossible. A: Oh bother. . . .
8. Q: So knowledge and perception are not the same.9
In this context, irreflexivity makes sense. The questioner aims to derive some
statement other than the starting point, p. In fact, the questioner aims to derive
the contradictory of the starting point, not-p, known here as the ‘conclusion’. In
this game, the questioner must build up enough premises to force the answerer
to admit not-p; the questioner does this by getting the answerer to agree to
the premises. But the answerer will not agree to a premise that is just identical
to not-p: if the answerer does this she will immediately lose. This ensures that
no premise that the answerer is willing to admit is identical to the conclusion.
Because of this feature of the dialectical game, irreflexivity makes sense as a
pragmatic condition in dialectic.
Not all question-and-answer interactions aim at driving the answerer into
contradiction: didactic syllogismoi, which I mentioned above, aim at one party,
the answerer, increasing their knowledge. Didactic arguments move from
premises that are more familiar to the learner/ answerer to the conclusion,
which is less familiar (cf. Smith 1997: 127–8). Remarks on how didactic dis-
cussion would work in detail are scattered throughout Aristotle’s corpus, but
it seems that (i) didactic arguments proceed to truths, because no one would
teach a falsehood (Smith 1997: 159a29-30; cf. 161a25); (ii) the starting points for
didactic are proper to the branch of science in question (Forster 1955: 165b2–3).
Moreover, (iii) the learner/answerer should always agree to reputable opin-
ions, which are moves on the way to the conclusion (Smith 1997: 159a30). But
clearly, the central feature of didactic is connecting the conclusion, which is
less familiar to the learner/answerer, to the premises, which are more familiar
to her. And this is sufficient for irreflexivity in this context. The conclusion and
the premises differ in one important aspect: the former is less familiar to the
learner than the latter.
9 I loosely base this fictional dialectical game on one of Socrates’ refutations of the ‘Knowledge
is perception’ thesis at Theaetetus 161–3.
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I now consider eristic syllogismoi. Like dialectic and didactic syllogismoi, eristic
syllogismoi have a question-and-answer format. In one sense, eristic syllogismoi
should obviously be irreflexive. As Alexander points out, their purpose is to
conclude, on the basis of things that the answerer grants, something that
the answerer is unwilling to grant (On Prior Analytics: 18, 30). Clearly, if the
answerer grants the conclusion there will be no need for an eristic syllogismos,
so irreflexivity makes sense as a condition on syllogismoi. But we should say
more here. For example, how does irreflexivity in the eristic context relate
to the fallacy of begging the question? Maybe reflexivity is excluded from
eristic to rule out begging the question. This, however, cannot be the right
explanation. In eristic, no fallacy is ruled out: you can use any argument you
can get away with. Understanding eristic as a game allows us to explain the
relationship between begging the question and irreflexivity. Aristotle suggests
that irreflexivity is a condition on eristic syllogismoi because it is a strategic
advantage for the questioner to respect irreflexivity, not because irreflexivity is
a constitutive rule of the eristic game that the questioner must respect.
We can see this from Aristotle’s discussion of how to respond to an attack
that uses the petitio principii fallacy. In the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle says:
(T7) Concerning those [fallacies of] begging and taking the starting point in the enquiry, if
it is clear, it should not be granted to the questioner, even if it be a true, reputable opinion.
But if the questioner takes (the starting point) covertly, because of the mischievousness of
such arguments, one must let one’s failure [to notice this] fall back on the questioner on
the ground that he has not been debating properly. For refutation is without (assumption)
of the starting point. Straight away, you must say that it was not given to be used for
this, but to be used for a syllogismos of the opposite of this, or for a side-refutation (Forster
1955: 181a15–23, modified).
Aristotle gives defensive advice to the answerer: suppose the questioner
attempts to ‘take the starting point’, i.e., beg the question. In this case, two
defences are available to the answerer. The prospective strategy is better: do
not grant the starting point when it is asked, even if it is ‘true’ and ‘reputable’.
But what if the questioner ‘covertly’ gets the answerer to admit the starting
point and the answerer only notices when it is too late? The text says that the
answerer should retort that the questioner has not been debating properly ‘for
refutation is without (assumption) of the starting point’. This refers toAristotle’s
contention in the Sophistical Refutations that each fallacy can be explained as not
meeting one or more points in the definition of a refutation, part of which is
the definition of syllogismos (Forster 1955: 164a23–7; 168b22–6). Presumably, the
move violates the definition of a refutation because it violates the definition of a
syllogismos, which suggests Aristotle has a violation of irreflexivity inmind. Now,
although Aristotle notes that begging the question is a fallacy and explains why,
his advice is not that the answerer should simply point out the fallacy. Rather,
Aristotle’s advice, if the answerer is caught out and grants the starting point,
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p, is that the answerer should say that p was not granted for an argument to p.
Instead the answerer should say that p was granted for a different argument:
a side-refutation or syllogismos to not-p.
All this suggests that Aristotle thinks begging the question is a bad strategy
for the questioner in eristic. Bolton (1994: 110) suggests that it might be a strate-
gic error in dialectic for the questioner to ask straight out for the conclusion,
because then the answerer will know what the questioner is trying to establish.
I do not think that this is correct, since in most cases, the answerer will already
know what the questioner is trying to conclude, namely, the contradictory of
the starting point. Nevertheless, if Bolton agrees that begging the question is a
strategic error, he might agree that irreflexivity could be considered strategic
advice. Aristotle here offers advice to the answerer, but the questioner must
attempt to give a syllogismos in the eristic context. So what would be the ques-
tioner’s strategy in a contest like this? There is no rule against the questioner
trying to take the starting point, at least from the point of view of eristic: in
the above passage Aristotle does not advise the answerer to retort that the
questioner violated a rule; rather he advises the answerer to claim that the
starting point was granted for some other reason than deducing itself. But
the questioner would be well advised not to attempt such a move in eristic,
since the response that the answerer can give is obvious: the starting point was
granted not for its own derivation, but for some other purpose. Producing a
syllogismos where the conclusion differs from the premises is a piece of strategic
advice for the questioner, so that the question-begging move does not rebound
on her.
This way of understanding the relationship between begging the question
and irreflexivity in eristic may illuminate the nature of eristic dialectic. On
the one hand, some minimal constitutive rules constrain eristic: there are
two players, a questioner and an answerer, and each has a goal (deriving an
apparent contradiction or resisting one). However, there are not only rules that
constitute the game, but also what one might call ‘strategic rules’: instructions
for how to play the game well. Aristotle’s reasons for making irreflexivity a
pragmatic condition on the syllogismos in eristic game-playing may not pertain
to the constitutive rules of dialectic, but rather strategic advice to the questioner,
given certain possible countermoves by the answerer. If the questioner sneaks
in the conclusion, there is a countermove available to the answerer. So it is
better not to try to sneak in the conclusion at all. This piece of strategic advice,
to argue irreflexively, becomes a pragmatic condition on being a syllogismos.
Peirastic, or ‘testing’, syllogismoi are not clearly characterised in Aristotle’s
dialectical works. Aristotle discusses peirastic and dialectical syllogismoi together
in Topics VIII. 5. I read the passage this way. Aristotle starts with some general
remarks that apply to dialectic, not yet peirastic in particular. He says that the
argument must begin with a thesis that is acceptable (endoxon) or unacceptable
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(adoxon), either simpliciter or to the specific person being tested (Smith 1997:
159b1–3; cf. Forster 1955: 183a37–b1, where peirastic and dialectic are said to
deduce from endoxa). Since the conclusion is the opposite of the thesis, if the
thesis is acceptable, the conclusion will be unacceptable and vice versa. This
holds regardless of to whom the thesis is acceptable or unacceptable (159b5).
Peirastic dialectic begins with a thesis that is acceptable to the answerer. The
conclusion will therefore be unacceptable to the answerer.
Aristotle does not tell us exactly what to do in the case where the thesis is
acceptable to the answerer, but he does tell us how to proceed when the thesis
is acceptable simpliciter. In that case, (i) the conclusion will be unacceptable
simpliciter (159b17); (ii) the answerer should concede everything that seems
correct (159b18) and (iii) anything that does not seem correct, but is more
acceptable than the conclusion (159b19–20). Adding the relevant qualifications,
in a peirastic dialectic: (i’) the conclusion will be unacceptable to the answerer
(ii’) the answerer should concede everything that seems correct to her and (iii’)
anything which does not seem correct to her but is more acceptable to her than
the conclusion.
Irreflexivity holds of peirastic arguments, so understood. A peirastic argu-
ment forces the answerer to admit an unacceptable conclusion, on the basis
of a thesis and premises that are more acceptable to her than the conclusion.
It is easy to see that irreflexivity holds here. Aristotle gives constitutive rules
that together entail that the conclusion will have a property not shared by any
of the premises: it will be less acceptable to the answerer than any premise.
This entails that the premises differ from the conclusion. The premises and
conclusion do not share all properties so cannot be identical. Therefore, in
this pragmatic context irreflexivity makes sense as a condition on syllogistic
consequence.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has given a novel account of Aristotle’s irreflexivity condition
in his definition of a syllogismos at Prior Analytics 24b18–20. Traditionally, the
explanation of this somewhat puzzling condition has been that (i) irreflexivity
holds in some pragmatic contexts, (ii) irreflexivity holds because it rules out
begging the question in these contexts; so, (iii) Aristotle introduced irreflexivity
as a constitutive condition on being a syllogismos. I showed in section II that
both (i) and (ii) are problematic. (i) is too weak to form part of an explanation of
irreflexivity; we need to show that irreflexivity holds in all pragmatic contexts
which Aristotle considers. I also criticized (ii): irreflexivity is insufficient to rule
out all arguments Aristotle considers question begging. So irreflexivity was not
introduced to rule out begging the question.
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I gave a more satisfying explanation of the role of reflexivity in Aristotle’s
definition, by looking at all of the pragmatic contexts that Aristotle considers
relevant. In each of those contexts, irreflexivity makes sense as a condition,
although for different reasons, without appeal to ruling out begging the ques-
tion. So Aristotle includes irreflexivity as a constitutive condition on being a
syllogismos. But to explain the presence of irreflexivity in Aristotle’s definition, I
appealed to an assumption whereby a condition, which holds in all pragmatic
contexts, holds constitutively. This assumption is shared by the traditional
explanation.
This paper has treated each of these contexts independently, for analytical
purposes. But there may be interesting reasons why syllogismoi in different con-
texts converge on irreflexivity. For example, in mono-agent demonstrations the
premises must be more acceptable than the conclusion (Smith 1989: 64b31–2;
cf. Smith 1997: 159b8–9). When Aristotle comes to discuss multi-agent dialec-
tic, particularly the use of dialectic for training (Smith 1997: 159a25–6) and
inquiry (Smith 1997: 101a34–7), he formulates a corresponding condition for
multi-agent contexts: the premises the answerer grants should be more acceptable
than the conclusion (Smith 1997: 131). It may be that multi-agent dialectic was
used to train people to give better demonstrations. The trainee demonstrator
could be faced with an ‘answerer’ trying to block their demonstration. If so, it
makes sense to specify that such an answerer should not admit a premise, un-
less it is more acceptable than the conclusion, since this condition corresponds
to how to give a good demonstration. A certain use of question-and-answer
dialectic could be to train demonstrators. Such training dialectics would need
irreflexivity as a condition.
The key historical contribution of this paper is to show that, for Aristotle,
one constitutive condition, irreflexivity, may be a condition for different rea-
sons in different contexts, but if irreflexivity is a condition in all contexts, it
is a constitutive condition on being a syllogismos. This historical result speaks
to more systematic concerns. Contemporary philosophers of logic are sus-
picious of non-reflexive consequence relations. But Aristotle embraces one.
This paper has shown that irreflexivity makes sense to Aristotle as a con-
dition on consequence precisely because he considers consequence to be a
property of arguments used in contexts. Aristotle systematically looks at con-
texts in which syllogismoi are used, and concludes that such arguments must
be irreflexive. This approach makes irreflexivity seem a necessary condition
on consequence to Aristotle. But it is hard to say that a consequence rela-
tion rooted in argumentative practice is suspicious. After all, logicians are
supposed to study arguments. This may invite a dilemma: either we ad-
mit that logical consequence is divorced from at least some uses to which
arguments are put or we accept that requirements that even logical plural-
ists find disreputable, such as irreflexivity, may condition some consequence
relations.
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